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Perhaps the most significant problem raised by the present case
is the interpretation to be given the words "subject-matter."
If
"subject-matter," as used in the statute, has a broader meaning than
"issue," as used in the common law, possible applications of the statute are proportionately increased. The relation of lunacy proceedings
to probate proceedings is only one aspect of the problem. The relations between other actions which may at first blush seem to be distinctly different in "issue" may be similar in "subject-matter" and
testimony may be carried over from one to the other. The exact content and limits to be given "subject-matter" will, however, have to
await further judicial pronouncements.
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PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS IN WRONGFUL DEATH AcTiON.-Plaintiffadministratrix brought a wrongful death action against defendantadministrator two years and nine months after the death of plaintiff's

intestate. Defendant claimed that the two-year period of limitation
under Section 130 of the New York Decedent Estate Law was a bar
to the action. Plaintiff relied upon Section 21 of the New York Civil
Practice Act which provides that in the case of the death of a person
who would have been liable if he had lived, a period of eighteen
months is not a part of the period of limitation for the commencement
of an action against his executor or administrator. The Appellate
Division held that Section 21 was applicable and suspended the running of the statute of limitations for eighteen months. McDonough
v. Cestare, 3 A.D.2d 201, 159 N.Y.S.2d 616 (2d Dep't 1957).*
When the legislature, which has the power to create a new right
otherwise unknown to the law, does so, and in the statute of creation
imposes a limitation, such limitation is part of the grant of power.
The time within which such action may be instituted is subject to
such limitation and to no other limitation.1 A contrary view holds
that the problem is basically one of statutory construction and the
fact that the limitation is contained in the statute of creation
is but
2
one factor to consider in interpreting the legislative intent.
* Motion for leave to appeal denied, 3 A.D.2d 861, 163 N.Y.S.2d 376 (2d
Dep't 1957).
1Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926) ; The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199
(1886); Cimo v. New York, 306 N.Y. 143, 116 N.E.2d 290 (1953); Gatti
Paper Stock Corp. v. Erie R.R., 247 App. Div. 45, 268 N.Y. Supp. 669 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mnem., 272 N.Y. 535, 4 N.E.2d 724 (1936).
2 "...
[T]he fact that the limitation is contained in the same section or
the same statute is material only as bearing on construction. It is merely a
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An action for wrongful death, unknown at common law, 3 was
originally created by Lord Campbell's Act in England in 1846. 4 One
year later it became part of New York law.5 Today, the right of
action is found in the Decedent Estate Law 6 and is protected by the
New York State Constitution.7
Many New York statutes contain their own periods of limitation.8 The periods of limitation for other actions, usually those which
existed at common law, are found in Article 2 of the Civil Practice
Act,9 which also contains many general or beneficial provisions. 10
Whether to apply these provisions only to actions whose periods of
limitation are also found in Article 2 or to extend them to statutes
containing their own periods of limitation is a basic problem.
1
In Hill v. Board of Supervisors,"
the Court of Appeals refused
12
to apply the predecessor of Section 23 of the Civil Practice Act
to an action, unknown at common law, which had been created by
the legislature. The court said:
[T]hat, as this action is brought under a special law and is maintainable
[..
ground for saying that the limitation goes to the right created and accompanies
the obligation everywhere. The same conclusion Would be reached if the limitation was in a different statute, provided it was directed to the newly created
liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right." Davis
v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
3PRASHKER, N-w YoRK PRAcrIcE § 24 (3d ed. 1954); PROssER, ToRTs
§ 105, at 705 (2d ed. 1955).
4 9 & 10 VIcr., C.93 (1846).
5 Laws of N.Y. 1847, c. 450.
6 N.Y. DEFCD. EsT. LAW § 130. Before 1935, if the defendant who by his
act or neglect negligently caused the death of the plaintiff also died, the cause
of action abated with the death of the defendant. In that year, the action
was made to survive the defendant's death and the defendant's estate was held
liable for the damages. Id. § 118.
7N.Y. CoxsT. art. 1, § 16.
8 See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 168(6) (b) (one year to commence an action
to recover on a New York standard fire insurance policy); N.Y. LmN LAW
§ 189(3) (one year for a hospital to enforce a lien).
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 48 (six years to commence an action
upon a contract obligation or liability, express or implied); id. § 49 (three
years to commence an action to recover damages for injuries to property or
person arising from negligence) ; id. § 51 (one year to commence an action to
recover damages for libel and slander).
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §§ 17, 23. The material portion of § 17
states that "an attempt to commence an action in a court of record is equivalent to the commencement thereof . . . when the summons is delivered, with
the intent that it shall be actually served, to the sheriff. . . ." The material

portion of § 23 states that "if an action is commenced within the time limited
therefor, and a judgment therein is reversed on appql without awarding a
new trial, or the action is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary
discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff . .. may commence a
new action for the same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and
within one year after such reversal or termination."
"1119 N.Y. 344, 23 N.E. 921 (1890).
12 See note 10 supra.
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solely by its authority, the limitation of time is so incorporated with the remedy
given as to make it an integral part of it and the condition precedent to the
3
maintenance of the action at all.'

Notwithstanding the Hill case, the general provisions of Article
2 have been extended to statutes containing their own periods of
limitation. 14 The rationale of the Hill case has been limited to cases
where a new cause of action has been created and the tendency today
is to extend the application of the general provisions to statutory
enactments containing their own periods of limitation.'6 In so doing,
the courts find sanction in legislative intent. 16 The tendency also
17
finds support in the Civil Practice Act itself.
In 1847, the wrongful death statute in New York contained a
proviso 'Sstating that the action could be brought ". . . provided that
every such action shall be commenced within two years...." 19 The
.3
Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 119 N.Y. 344, 347, 23 N.E. 921 (1890).
The plaintiff brought the action, unknown at common law, under a special
law which allowed recovery if one's property was destroyed by rioting. The
act stated that no action could be maintained "unless ... brought within three
months after the loss." The action was brought within three months in the
county court which dismissed it for want of jurisdiction. After the three
months had expired but within one year after the dismissal, the plaintiff tried
to bring a new action under the predecessor of § 23 of the Civil Practice Act.
The action was dismissed.
14 Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594 (1915), which
involved basically the same fact pattern as the Hill case; Conoly v. Hyams,
176 N.Y. 403, 68 N.E. 662 (1903) ; Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N.Y. 327,
50 N.E. 863 (1898), which applied the predecessor of § 17 of the Civil Practice Act (see note 10 supra) in an action to recover on a New York standard
fire insurance policy.
15 Gaines v. City of New York, note 14 supra; Hamilton v. Royal Ins.
Co., note 14 supra; Lebrecht v. Orence, 199 Misc. 1025, 105 N.Y.S.2d 318
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1951) ; Kerr v. St. Luke's Hosp., 176 Misc. 610, 28 N.Y.S.2d
193 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd mem., 262 App. Div. 822, 29 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mem., 287 N.Y. 673, 39 N.E.2d 291 (1941). Contra, Kaplan v. Uribe,
286 8App. Div. 156, 142 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1st Dep't 1955).
1 Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., sapra note 14, at 334, 50 N.E. at 865; Hayden
v. Pierce, 144 N.Y. 512, 516, 518, 39 N.E. 638, 639, 640 (1895).
'1N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 2. Section 10 of the Civil Practice Act states
that the periods of limitation contained in Article 2 contain all the rules of
limitation, except where a different limitation is specially prescribed by law or
by the written contract of the parties. This phrase, rules of limitation, has
been held to refer to the specific periods of limitation contained in Article 2,
i.e., libel and slander, one year, and not to the general provisions. Titus v.
Poole, 145 N.Y. 414, 40 N.E. 228 (1895); Hayden v. Pierce, supra note 16;
accord, Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., supra note 14. Thus § 10 is not a ground
for implying that the general or beneficial provisions are not to be applied to
special statutes.
isA proviso is a clause which removes special cases from the general enactment and provides for them specially. 2 SUTHERLAND, SrATUroRY CoNsTrUcTION § 4830 (3d ed. 1943). Its purpose is to restrict the general operation of
the enacting part of the act. 2 SUTHERMAND, op. cit. supra §4932. The
tendency today is to interpret the proviso according to the legislative intent.
Ibid.
19 Laws of N.Y. 1847, c. 450, § 2.
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proviso was maintained in the death action until 1880 when the latter
was brought over into the Code of Civil Procedure with the proviso
omitted.20 The wrongful death action was considered in New York
and in other states to be an entirely new cause of action. Hence,
21
all of its provisions were looked upon as conditions precedent. 22
Ltd.
Lines
Inland
v.
in
Sharrow
Appeals
Then, in 1915 the Court of
expressly held that the two-year period of limitation was merely a
23
limitation upon the remedy and not a limitation upon the right itself.
The chief reason given was that the omission in 1880 of the proviso
by the legislature was not "unintentional" or "ineffectual." 24 Under
the principle of the Sharrow case, the complaint in a wrongful death
action need not now allege that the action was commenced
within two
25
years. The defense must be raised by answer.
Section 21 of the Civil Practice Act 26 was passed to make certain that the confusion attendant upon the death of a defendant would
not prevent the plaintiff from bringing the action.2 7 It does not enlarge the time stated in the statute of limitations but merely suspends
its operation.2 8 A plaintiff in a wrongful death action has also been
allowed, upon the underlying theory of the Sharrow case, to avail

N.Y. CoDE Civ. Paoc. § 1902.
119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886); Pernisi v. "John Schmalz'
Sons (Inc.)," 142 App. Div. 53, 126 N.Y. Supp. 880 (2d Dep't 1910) ; Gulledge
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 147 N.C. 234, 60 S.E. 1134 (1908) ; accoid, Colell
20

21 The Harrisburg,

v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 80 App. Div. 342, 80 N.Y. Supp. 675 (2d Dep't
1903). Contra, Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. 146 (1859).
22214 N.Y. 101, 108 N.E. 217 (1915).
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 105, 108 N.E. at 218. Furthermore, other reasons were that the action had been made a constitutional right by the people; the novelty of the action
in the courts had disappeared; and the fact that no valid reason existed why
the benefits of the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure should
not 2be
5 given to a plaintiff in a wrongful death action. Ibid.
Corico v. Smith, 178 App. Div. 33, 164 N.Y. Supp. 190 (4th Dep't),
modified, 180 App. Div. 916, 166 N.Y. Supp. 1090 (4th Dep't 1917); Agresta
v. Federal Steam Nay. Co., 169 App. Div. 467, 155 N.Y. Supp. 343 (2d Dep't
1915). However, if the death action arises in a foreign state which considers
the provisions of the death action as conditions precedent, New York will also
consider the provisions as conditions precedent. See Schwertfeger v. Scandinavian Air Lines, 186 App. Div. 89, 174 N.Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
226 N.Y. 696, 123 N.E. 888 (1919); McKinney v. Schuster, 202 Misc. 450,
110 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct 1952).
28 The material portion of § 21 states that "the term of eighteen months
after the death within this state of a person against whom a cause of action
exists . . . is not a part of the time limited for the commercement of an
action against his executor or administrator."
27 See Butler v. Price, 271 App. Div. 359, 362, 65 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (4th
Dep't 1946).
28Id. at 361, 65 N.Y.S2d at 690.
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himself of Section 19 29 of the Civil Practice Act. 30 However, the
general provisions of Article 2 cannot be availed of if the death action
contains a provision expressly to the contrary. 31
The instant case strengthens the trend to extend and liberalize
the general provisions of Article 2 with respect to statutes containing
their own periods of limitation.

29 The material portion of § 19 states that "if, after a cause of action has
accrued against a person, he departs from the state and remains continuously
absent therefrom for the space of four months or more . . . the time of his
absence . . . is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action."
30 Philips v. Apuzzo, 241 App. Div. 762, 270 N.Y.S.2d 973 (2d Dep't 1934),
aff'd mem., 266 N.Y. 579, 195 N.E. 208 (1935).
31 Jones v. 416 Pleasant Ave. Holding Corp., 304 N.Y. 893, 110 N.E.2d
886 (1953) (mem. opinion). Although the right to relief in a wrongful death
action accrues on the appointment of the executor or the administrator, the
death statute specifically provides that the two-year period of limitation is to
be computed from the time of the decedent's death. Id. at 894.

